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Diplomacy must address fears in the Caucasus
By Abdujalil Abdurasulov
Posted: April 11, 2006
The end of the 1980s witnessed an explosion of conflicts in the South
Caucasus. Several conflicts broke out at about the same time; at least
three of them presented a similar situation. The current state of affairs
in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia could be described
as ‘no war, no peace’. Many academics used the framework of ‘Soviet
legacy’ to explain these wars of the early 90s. Such an understanding
of these conflicts resulted in remarkably similar attempts to resolve
them. And all these attempts failed.
The Soviet legacy, as evident in attempts at constructing ‘nations’ by
providing people with territory and by artificially drawing borders, was
believed to be the main cause of the conflicts. It institutionalized the
existence of different ‘nations’ – Azeri, Armenians, Abkhaz, etc. – within
a single Soviet state. This meant that after the collapse of the Soviet
Union, conflicts inevitably followed because parts of the population –
ethnic minorities – rejected nationalistic projects of another nation and
did not accept new political entities as legitimate.
The problem in looking at these conflicts through the framework of
institutionalized multinationality was that it yielded a universal
approach to resolving these conflicts. In all negotiations to establish
peace in the region, it was assumed that the source of the problem
was status. They were all indeed negotiations which implied that each
party to the conflict had some interests which were pursued rationally.
The psychological factor of feelings and attitudes was not considered
in most conflict-resolution schemes in the South Caucasus.
Consequently, negotiations in all three cases had little success.
Neither the Abkhaz, nor the Ossetians, nor Karabakh Armenians were
ready to sign a treaty that would confirm the principle of territorial
integrity.
Similarly, both Georgia and Azerbaijan refused to sign an agreement
unless their territorial integrity was guaranteed. Negotiations that
demanded each side to compromise reinforced their frustration which
resulted in the protracted nature of the conflicts. The offers of ‘package’
or ‘step-by-step’ negotiations in the cases of Karabakh and Abkhazia
and the language of a ‘political settlement’ demonstrated how
mediators viewed the conflicts. Additionally, the Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) offered a ‘common state’
solution in the case of Karabakh. But all these proposals rested on the
assumption that the task was to settle a dispute over interests and did
not address fears and mistrust of conflicting parties in the population.
Such feelings contributed to the continuance of the conflicts. Ossetian
refugees from Georgia and Georgian refugees from South Ossetia
refused to return to their homes because they feared they would be
slaughtered or discriminated against. The same concerns were
present among refugees who suffered in the other conflicts. In fact,
some 60,000 Georgians returned to Gali region in Abkhazia by mid-
1997. This instigated new tensions and forced Georgians to flee for the
second time.
Instead of traditional diplomacy used by UN and OSCE, new types of
diplomacy such as multi-track diplomacy, a term coined by Louis
Diamond, are necessary to create conditions for actors to come to an
agreement and achieve sustainable peace. Conflict transformation and
reconciliation, argued John Paul Lederach, are a necessary process in
peace building. Such steps would address the psychological factor of
conflicts too. Feelings of hatred and fear must be transformed, negative
attitudes need to be changed, and psychological trauma and wounds
have to be healed in order to create peaceful relations.
Such efforts can be most effectively undertaken by civil society, religion,
media and under other tracks of the multi-track diplomacy model, and
will lay the necessary foundation for further talks to sign peace treaties
at the official level. Importantly, acknowledging needs and the
psychological part of the conflicts will help identify similarities in the
cases and prevent negotiators from ignoring distinct features. Such
acknowledgement is necessary for successful conflict resolution
activities, as it requires the development of methods different from
conflict to conflict depending on the peculiarities of each case.
### ### ###
Abdujalil Abdurasulov is a graduate student in Russian and Post-Soviet
Studies at the London School of Economics and Political Science.
By Abdujalil Abdurasulov
Posted: April 11, 2006
The end of the 1980s witnessed an explosion of conflicts in the South
Caucasus. Several conflicts broke out at about the same time; at least
three of them presented a similar situation. The current state of affairs
in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia could be described
as ‘no war, no peace’. Many academics used the framework of ‘Soviet
legacy’ to explain these wars of the early 90s. Such an understanding
of these conflicts resulted in remarkably similar attempts to resolve
them. And all these attempts failed.
The Soviet legacy, as evident in attempts at constructing ‘nations’ by
providing people with territory and by artificially drawing borders, was
believed to be the main cause of the conflicts. It institutionalized the
existence of different ‘nations’ – Azeri, Armenians, Abkhaz, etc. – within
a single Soviet state. This meant that after the collapse of the Soviet
Union, conflicts inevitably followed because parts of the population –
ethnic minorities – rejected nationalistic projects of another nation and
did not accept new political entities as legitimate.
The problem in looking at these conflicts through the framework of
institutionalized multinationality was that it yielded a universal
approach to resolving these conflicts. In all negotiations to establish
peace in the region, it was assumed that the source of the problem
was status. They were all indeed negotiations which implied that each
party to the conflict had some interests which were pursued rationally.
The psychological factor of feelings and attitudes was not considered
in most conflict-resolution schemes in the South Caucasus.
Consequently, negotiations in all three cases had little success.
Neither the Abkhaz, nor the Ossetians, nor Karabakh Armenians were
ready to sign a treaty that would confirm the principle of territorial
integrity.
Similarly, both Georgia and Azerbaijan refused to sign an agreement
unless their territorial integrity was guaranteed. Negotiations that
demanded each side to compromise reinforced their frustration which
resulted in the protracted nature of the conflicts. The offers of ‘package’
or ‘step-by-step’ negotiations in the cases of Karabakh and Abkhazia
and the language of a ‘political settlement’ demonstrated how
mediators viewed the conflicts. Additionally, the Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) offered a ‘common state’
solution in the case of Karabakh. But all these proposals rested on the
assumption that the task was to settle a dispute over interests and did
not address fears and mistrust of conflicting parties in the population.
Such feelings contributed to the continuance of the conflicts. Ossetian
refugees from Georgia and Georgian refugees from South Ossetia
refused to return to their homes because they feared they would be
slaughtered or discriminated against. The same concerns were
present among refugees who suffered in the other conflicts. In fact,
some 60,000 Georgians returned to Gali region in Abkhazia by mid-
1997. This instigated new tensions and forced Georgians to flee for the
second time.
Instead of traditional diplomacy used by UN and OSCE, new types of
diplomacy such as multi-track diplomacy, a term coined by Louis
Diamond, are necessary to create conditions for actors to come to an
agreement and achieve sustainable peace. Conflict transformation and
reconciliation, argued John Paul Lederach, are a necessary process in
peace building. Such steps would address the psychological factor of
conflicts too. Feelings of hatred and fear must be transformed, negative
attitudes need to be changed, and psychological trauma and wounds
have to be healed in order to create peaceful relations.
Such efforts can be most effectively undertaken by civil society, religion,
media and under other tracks of the multi-track diplomacy model, and
will lay the necessary foundation for further talks to sign peace treaties
at the official level. Importantly, acknowledging needs and the
psychological part of the conflicts will help identify similarities in the
cases and prevent negotiators from ignoring distinct features. Such
acknowledgement is necessary for successful conflict resolution
activities, as it requires the development of methods different from
conflict to conflict depending on the peculiarities of each case.
### ### ###
Abdujalil Abdurasulov is a graduate student in Russian and Post-Soviet
Studies at the London School of Economics and Political Science.
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